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Case ana Comment
ST A N LEY  v. DOUGLAS (1951) 4 D . L. R. 689
Counsel — Witness — Competency — Ground for New Trial 
— Judicial Control —
The Supreme Court of Canada, in this case was confronted with 
the unsavory situation created by a lawyer acting as both counsel and 
witness during a trial. Three rules relating to counscl-witnesscs mav be 
found in the observations and comments of four of the five judges who 
heard the appeal. (1) These three rules are as follows: (1) A party’s 
counsel is a competent witness; (2) when counsel gives evidence as 
a witness the court has the power to control his conduct bv refusing 
to allow him to continue as counsel; and (3) when a counsel has given 
evidence as a witness the court may order a new trial. The appeal is 
of interest because it is the first reported ease in which these three rules 
have been considered to be co-existent and of equal importance. In 
previous cases where two or more of these rules were considered, it 
appears that the courts always held one of them as paramount to 
the others.
The appeal involved the admission to probate of a will in Prince 
Edward Island. The decision of the Probate Judge to allow probate 
of the will was appealed to the Supreme Court en banc of that Pro­
vince and a new trial ordered. (2) Campbell C. J., who delivered 
the judgment of that court based his decision on the ground that the 
cumulative effcct of three considerations led him to the conclusion 
that the evidence was not in a satisfactory form to assess the factual 
elements at their real value. The third consideration which he dealt 
with was that the case for the cxccutor of the will was conducted 
mainly by his senior counsel, who was also the principal witness 
examined (to support the validity of the will).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada turned substan­
tially on the question whether the Supreme Court of Prince Edward 
Island had the jurisdiction to order a new trial. However the matter 
of the senior counsel acting as a witness at the trial received sufficient 
consideration to warrant comment on that question.
It is clear that the courts disapprove of counsel acting as a witness. 
The procedure has been variously described as irregular and contrary 
to practice an indecent proceeding, contrary to ethics, an objectionable 
practicc, a disgracc, and an outrage to dcccncy. The reasoning behind 
this judicial condemnation is indicated by the following extracts from 
cases:
i l i  K e rw in , T asch ere au , K e llo ck  and C artw rig h t J J . .  Hand J . .  m aking  no o b serv a­
tions on th e m atter o f co u n sel-w ttn ess
I 2> 119501. 25 M. P . R. C am pbell. C. J . .  M acG uig.in  and T w eedy J J .
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It is verv unfit that he (counsel) should he |>fimilted to state, not upon  
oath , facts to  the jury which he aftei wards stated to them  on his 
oath . (S)
Counsel can n ot l»e unbiased witnesses, and if p erm itted  w ithout 
check to be witnesses th ere  would be not only the revolting indeccncy  
of the proceedings, but the possible difficulty of th e jinx beiitg unable  
to distinguish between w hat the counsel said as an advocate and w hat 
he said as a witness. (4)
It is m ost h u m iliatin g  for counscl to be allow ed to give evidence, and  
then addiess the ju ry , trying to m ake them  believe his evidence to be 
tm c . (.'>)
T h e  llcn ch  should not be called upon to discuss with counsel the  
weight t<> be attach ed  to evidence offered by counsel himself. T h e  
giving of such evidence must have the effect of preven tin g a full and  
free discussion on the p art of both counsel and llench and to th at 
e xten t, at least, serves to h am per the prop er ad m in istration  of justice. (0)
Substantially these quotations resolve themselves into the proposi­
tion that it is improper for counsel to address the court or a jury on 
his own evidence. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in recog­
nising the three rules under consideration has ensured that in future 
the courts need not be embarasscd by the counsel-witness. There can 
no longer be am question about the rule that counsel is a competent 
witness. Cartwrigiit }. (7) carcfully reviewed the authorities and 
propcrlv came to the conclusion that evidence of counsel is legally 
admissible. (8)
There also appears to be no question about the rule that the 
court mav order a new trial 011 the ground that counscl was a witness. 
Kerwin J. who delivered the judgment of Taschcreau J. and himself 
indicated approval of this rule by his statement:
I am  con ten t to agree with the C hief Ju stice  of th e Island th at for 
the reasons given by him  a new trial should be had. (9)
As the reader will recall, the fact that senior counscl acted as the 
main witness for plaintiff, was one of the reasons for ordering a 
new trial. Kellock }. indicated his approval of the rule as follows:
I think, how ever that the trial was so unsatisfactory as to  ren d er the  
d irection  with respect to a new trial the p rop er d irection . (10)
( 3) R ex V. B rive  (1819», 2 B . & Aid. 605; 106 E  R . 487.
( 4) Davis v. C anada F arm ers M utual Insu ran ce Co. (1876), 39 U .C .Q .B . 452, a t p. 482. 
( 5» Bank of B ritish  N orth A m erica v. M cEtroy (1875), 2 Pugs. 462; 15 N .B .R . 462.
( 6) R ob ert Bell Engine & T hresh er Co. Ltd . v. Gagne (1914), 29 W .L .R . 322 
( 7) r 1951 ] 4 D .L .R . a t p. G94. C artw rig h t J .  d issen tin g  in p art, b u t th a t p art of his 
ju d g m e n t re la tin g  to  co u n sel-w itn ess is n ot in co n flic t w ith  th e  m a jo rity  o f th e 
C ourt.
( 8) I t  is o f in te re s t to  n ote th a t in  th e Parish C ourts A ct. Ch. 122, R .S .N .B . 1927 
Sec . 12 co n ta in s a provision  th a t a p la in tiff or d efen d an t in a su it in a parish  
co u rt m ay ap p ear by an a tto rn e y  of th e Su p rem e C ourt b u t on th e tr ia l  o f a 
co n tested  cau se su ch  a tto rn e y  sh a ll n ot be a co m p eten t w itn ess fo r th e  p arty  
fo r  w hom  he appears.
T h is  s ta tu to ry  abrog atio n  of th e rig h t o f an a tto rn e y  to  be h is c lie n t’s w itn ess is 
th e  o n ly  in sta n ce  o f such  w h ich  th e w riter h as b een  a b le  to  fin d . No d oubt it  
stem s from  th e  lack  o f co n tro l w h ich  a parish  co u rt com m issio n er can  ex e rc ise  
o ver an a tto rn e y  w ho is an o ff ic e r  o f th e  S u p rem e C ourt, a problem  w h ich  of 
co u rse  is not faced  by  th e Su p rem e C ourt itse lf.
( 9) Supra., a t p. 692.
(10) Ibid., a t p. 693.
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Cartwright J., in his review of the eases relating to the matter of 
counsel witnesses, proved that the rule has been long established.
I he rule that the court may control the conduct of the counsel- 
witness, however has been the subjcct of considerable controversy in 
some jurisdictions. In New Brunswick the ru’e was recognized as 
earl\ as 1K2S. In the case of Hamilton v. McLean (11) the attorney 
and counsel for the plaintiff gave evidence at the trial to prove a 
document. On appeal the court held this was an irregular practice 
and in future it would require some other counsel to examine such 
a witness and comment on his testimony. The same principle is 
still in effect in New Brunswick and the court will require counscl 
who wislcs to give evidence to be examined bv another counscl and 
will not allow him to address the court upon his own testimony. (12) 
It is the writer’s understanding that the same practicc prevails in the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Kcrwin said:
I w ould  ;idd «»illv tli.it, w ith o u t d e c id in g  w h e th e r  su ch  e v id en ce  w o u ld  
Ik: a d m issib le  01 n o t , o n  su tli new  tr ia l  n o  o n e  a p p e a rin g  as co u n sel  
fo r  an y  p a r ty  sh o u ld  g ive e v id e n ce . (13 )
Mr. Justice Taschcreau adopted this statement and it would 
seem to indicate that the court has the power to control the actions 
of the counscl-witncss.
The controversy over the power of the court to control the 
conduct of the counscl-witncss was brought about by the judicial 
misapplication of the decision of the English case of Cobbett v. 
Hudson. (J4) The Cobbett case was decided in 1852 and resulted 
from an improvement in the law which allowed a party to an action 
to be his own witness. Prior to this, a party was allowed to conduct 
his own case but was prohibited from giving evidence. The removal 
of this prohibition allowed the first adventurous party-counsel-witncss 
to commence an action. In the Cobbett case the plaintiff sued in 
forma pauperis and conducted his own case. Lord Campbell C. J. 
at the trial told the plaintiff lie must elect to be either counsel or 
witness. The plaintiff electcd to be his own counsel and subsequently 
after losing the trial, appealed on the ground that he should also 
have been allowed to give his own evidence. The full court of 
Queen’s Bench (15) held that the Court could not derogate from
(11) (1828), C hipm an M .S. 47; 1 N .B .R . 192 (Sau n d ers C .J . ,  B o tsfo rd , B liss  and 
C hipm an J J . ) .
(12) (1951) B rod erick  v. Beyea. un rep orted  K .B .D . C ircu it s ittin g  p er B rid g es, J .  T h e  
sam e prin cip le  has been  recognized by th e C ourt o f A pp eal a lth ou g h  R itch ie  C. J .  
h eld  th a t th e opposing counsel should o b je c t  w hen h e deem s th e cou rse being  
pursued is o b jec tio n a b le , o therw ise th e  C ourt need  n ot in terfere . G ilbert v. 
C am pbell, (1870> 13 N .B .R . 55.
113) sn pra., a t p. 692.
(141 (1852), 1 E l &  B l. 11; 118 E .R . 341; 22 L .J .Q .B . 11.
(151 L o rd  C am pbell C .J . ,  C olerid ge, W ightm an and E r ie  J J . .
Lord  C am pbell in his live* of the C hancellors re ferred  to  th e firs t in stan ce of th e 
co u n sel-w itn ess w h ich  happened in  th e case of S ir  T hom as M ore, 1 H owe S t. T r. 
386. T h ere  th e  th en  S o lic ito r-G e n e ra l w ho w as con d u cting  th e  prosecution  in 
th e  language of th e  au th o r, “ to h is e tern a l d isg race and to  th e e tern a l d isgrace 
of th e  C ourt w ho perm itted  such an ou trag e on d ecency  le ft  th e b ar and presented  
h im self as a  w itn ess fo r th e C row n ” . A p p aren tly  h e w as s till o f th is  sen tim en t a t 
th e  tr ia l o f th e  C obbett case.
1161 it does n ot beh oove th e w riter a t th is  tim e to  con sid er th e e ffe c t of th is case  upon 
th e  p rin cip le  th a t a p arty  w ho conducts his ow n case  can n ot have coun sel to 
assist him . Robinson v. P alm er, 2 A llen  223 and G ilbert v. R aym ond, 3 P  & B . 315.
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the party's legal right to conduct his own ease and to be his own 
witness, which rights had been expressly given by statute. Accord­
ingly. it allowed the appeal. From this decision, one may derive the 
rule that a partv to an action mav be his own counscl and witness. (16) 
The misapplication of the decision ■ in the Cobbett case com­
menced with Davis v. Canada Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. (17) 
Harrison C. J. made a thorough study of the prcccdents and reported 
eases, omitting only the New Brunswick ease of Hamilton v. McLean. 
(18) The following part of his judgment expressly and clearly recog­
nizes the rule that the court may control counscl:
T h e  presiding judge m ay con tro l the con d u ct of counsel but has no  
righ t to reject his testim ony when tendered as a witness if a com petent 
witness. (19)
It is submitted that the learned Judge was in error in holding 
that the Cobbett case overruled the previous decision on the matter. 
This error is manifested in his statement referring to the Cobbett
ease.
T h e  fact th at the case was one of plaintiff in person actin g as his own 
advocate, and seeking to act as a witness, makes no difference in the  
ap p lication  of the rule. T h e  ru le  applied to him  is one which m ust 
be applied to any advocate w h ether actin g  for him self o r  any o th er  
person. (20)
Apparently there is the greatest difference* between a person act­
ing as his own advocate and counscl and a counscl acting for another 
party. In the one case the person is acting under statutory rights, does 
not represent a clicnt and is not acting as an officer of the court. In 
the other case he is acting on behalf of a clicnt and as an officer of the 
court subject to its discipline and control. Accordingly, the rule of the 
Cobbett ease would seem to have no application beyond a partv acting 
for himself.
The error of Chief Justice Harrison in attempting to extend the 
application of the Cobbett case was recognized by Cartwright J., who 
said:
W ith  g ieat respect for th e  con trary  view expressed by H arrison C. J .  in 
Davis v. C anadian F a n n ers  M utual In su ra n ce  C o.. it app ears to  m e th at 
C obbett v. H u d so n  . . . m ay not be of gen era! ap p lication , as in that 
case the plaintiff who. it was held, should have been allowed to testify  
was actin g as his own advocate. (21)
W ith this recognition, there should be no longer any question about 
the power of the court to control the conduct of the counsel-witness 
in all cases cxccpt where the party himself is the counsel-witness. Also, 
there should be no further question about the rights of the court, the 
counscl, the witness and the party to the action with respect to com­
petency, control and conduct of the trial when the partv or counscl 
wishes to give evidence.
(1 7 1 (18761, 39 U .C .Q .B . 452, a t p. 482 
(18i (1828) C hipm an M .S. 47.
(1 9 1 Supra., at p. 477.
(201 Supra., at p. 481.
(21» Supra., a t p. 015
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